35th RCT
Dave Kaufman Following the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, the 25th Infantry Division (25th ID) was pulled off Occupation duty in Japan and sent to Korea. The three regiments which made up the division, the 24th, 27th and 35th, had been stationed in the southern part of the Japanese home island of Honshu. The 24th had three over strength battalions (because Major General Edward M. Almond, MacArthur’s Chief of Staff, wanted the large numbers of Occupation duty black troops segregated into “one place”). The 27th and 35th Infantry were short key officers, NCOs, and equipment. Many vehicles of the two regiments had been salvaged from Pacific area battlefields and rebuilt in Japan.
The North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) had successfully overrun most of S. Korea. The only region not in enemy hands was the southeast portion, with the major port city of Pusan and another port city of Masan still free. The 27th was first to arrive in Pusan, Korea on July 10th, and joined with the 8th FA Bn to form the 27th RCT; the 24th followed on July 12th and joined with the 159th FA Bn to form the 24th RCT. The 35th arrived in Korea on July 13th and joined the 64th FA Bn to form the 35th RCT.
Col. Henry G. Fisher, who was a regimental WW II combat veteran with a sterling reputation as a fighter, commanded the 35th Infantry. Like the other divisional regiments, the 35th RCT was fragmented upon its arrival. The 1st Bn was sent up to Pohang, well up the eastern coast to relieve a battalion of the 27th RCT, and the remainder of the RCT was sent to Hamchang, guarding the 25th Infantry Division’s right. The NKPA began its initial assaults against 35th RCT elements on July 22nd, and when the ROK elements broke and fled, F Company was overwhelmed. The NKPA followed up on its initial success with an all-out tank-led assault the following day. Accurate FA fire and an air strike eliminated all five enemy tanks; the 35th RCT successfully held its position, despite another ROK unit withdrawal. The 35th and 27th RCTs were utilized to fill gaps in the remainder of the division lines for the next several days. The 25th ID was regrouped in the Taegu area to block a multi-divisional NKPA flanking movement. When it was determined the NKPA split its forces, the 25th ID was then shifted from the Taegu area to the southwest front to support the beleaguered 24th ID. The 35th RCT was in the area of Masan. A veteran North Korean division, which had been concentrated for an assault upon Susan and Pusan, was hit by Task Force Kean on August 7th. Named for the 25th Division Commander, the Task Force was composed of the 5th RCT, the 35th RCT of the 25th Division, the 1st Marine Brigade, and a ROK battalion. The TF objectives were the capture of Chinju, and the elimination of two veteran NKPA divisions. The 35th RCT was to spearhead the assault. The RCT met it s objectives, but once again the overwhelming numbers of NKPA units were able to infiltrate and split the TF elements. Two FA battalions were overrun and decimated. Other TF elements were directed to assist the FA units, but it was too late.
8th Army began consolidating forces in the area of what had become known as the “Naktong Bulge”. By the end of August the 35th RCT was up to strength with the addition of a battalion from the 29th Infantry. In early September, while in a solid defensive position, the RCT was attacked by the NKPA 6th and 7th Infantry Divisions. While the RCT fought back tenaciously, a ROK element withdrew and the 35th was cut off and surrounded. The 27th RCT and 89th Tank Bn were rushed to its defense, and supported by air strikes. When the offensive was over, the two NKPA divisions had been destroyed. The 35th RCT was awarded a Presidential Unit Citation for its actions in the Nam River area.
In mid-September, the RCT was committed to reinforce the 24th Infantry along the route to Chinju. A breakout offensive was coordinated with the Inchon landing on September 15th, but going was difficult. Blocking actions by the NKPA slowed the UN attack; the mountainous terrain, much of which was still held by a deeply dug-in NKPA, disrupted the UN efforts. The NKPA finally broke and withdrew, but the division was slow to pick up gains.
The 35th RCT overran Chinju and met up with the 24th RCT, and after a short break, the 35th was assigned to TF Dolvin with the mission of cutting off an NKPA escape route. TF Dolvin, named for the 89th Tank Bn CO, was extremely successful in accomplishing the mission. After linking up with another task force, the RCT continued patrolling and assaulting through the Fall of 1950. The enemy was now the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF).
As UN forces marched closer to the Yalu in November 1950, the 25th ID was situated in the center of the 8th Army line. The 35th RCT was assigned on the left in the vicinity of Unsan. Surprisingly, the team’s patrols met no CCF. When the 2nd CCF Offensive struck on the night of November 25, 1950, it missed the 35th’s positions. The 35th was withdrawn to support other divisional units that were taking the brunt of the CCF’s assault. Not until November 27th did the team make contact with the CCF. K Company did a thoroughly professional job of blocking the enemy and allowing men, tanks, artillery and vehicles of the TF to escape. By mid-December, the team was forced to withdraw along with the rest of the 8th Army under the onslaught all the way to the 38th Parallel.
Col. Fisher had become severely ill during the withdrawal, and was replaced by Col. Gerald C. Kelleher. Col. Kelleher was a highly and often decorated WW II battalion commander, as much a fighter as had his predecessor.
With the death of 8th Army commander Walton H. Walker in a jeep accident in December, Matthew Ridgway took over. Ridgway began making command-level personnel changes, with one of the exceptions being in the 25th ID. The beginning of 1951 saw the UN forces consolidating their forces and the ground. The 25th ID and its elements were dug in for the defense of Seoul. Under another massive CCF onslaught, the 35th was soon directed to withdraw. After capturing Seoul, the CCF stopped and the 8th Army regrouped. The 35th RCT was assigned to conduct a feint while another TF conducted a major counter attack. The team’s “feint” was extremely successful, and gave them additional confidence.
By late January, Operation Thunderbolt was now in the works, and the 35th, operating in the area of Osan, was on the left of the 25th ID, which was spearheading the operation. The carefully crafted operation was extremely successful, and the 35th, along with the 89th Tank Bn, captured Suwon. Ridgway recommended Col. Kelleher for promotion to brigadier general.
In early February, in snow and bitter cold, the team was again part of an offensive thrust into CCF held territory, this time against Hill 431. Meeting tough resistance, the 35th went around the hill, forcing the CCF to withdraw. More hill objectives found the 35th guarding the 89th Tank Bn at night. The team was then assigned with the Turkish Brigade and the 1st ROK Division to guard the Han River near Seoul in preparation for Operation Killer. CCF continued with their withdrawal in the face of losing an entire army in the most recent fighting.
Operation Killer, though ably planned, did not live up its name. The weather failed to cooperate, ammo was in short supply and was poorly distributed; and the unexpected non-battle death of the IX Corps commander helped doom it. The next mission was Operation Ripper, and the 35th was entailed (with the rest of the 25th ID) with crossing the flooded Han River. The objective was to push enemy forces past the 38th Parallel.
Under a markedly strong artillery barrage on March 7, 1951, the 25th ID and the other 8th Army units successfully crossed the Han River and achieved its objectives. The 35th had some difficulties in that engineers were unable to construct a footbridge within the prescribed time frame; the RCT had to use watercraft to cross. Once across, the team was soon relieved and utilized for protecting the divisional flank. Due to some political considerations, both operations were combined and renamed Operation Courageous. CCF and NKPA continued their steady withdrawals, offering little resistance.
On March 28, the 35th ran into heavy resistance when it was assigned the objective of capturing Chongsong. Artillery was unable to breach the CCF defenses, but the 35th met with great success utilizing creative small unit tactics.
April found Operation Rugged and the 35th was sent into reserve for the next anticipated CCF offensive. This soon changed and the 25th ID was assigned to cross the Hantan River. The crossing was successful and the division took up defensive positions. CCF counterattacks were either half-hearted or all out, but the division held.
On June 23, 1951, Jacob Malik, Deputy Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., made a statement in a recorded broadcast in New York implying Chinese and North Korean willingness to discuss armistice terms to end the Korean War. When Communist China indicated that it also desired peace, President Truman authorized General Ridgway to arrange for an armistice conference with the North Korean commander. Both aides agreed to begin negotiations at Kaesong on 10 July 1951.
It was agreed at the first meeting that military operations would continue until an armistice agreement was signed. However, neither aide was willing to start any large-scale offensive while peace talks were in progress. U.N. military action in this period was limited to combat patrolling, artillery and air bombardment, and the repulsing of enemy attacks.
On August 22nd, the Communists broke off negotiations.. The U.S. Eighth Army then launched a series of limited-objective attacks to improve its defensive positions. In early September, the 35th and 29th RCTs, a battalion of Turkish troops along with the remainder of the 25th ID assaulted CCF positions, and captured Hill 717 and Hill 682 the next day. The assault force then withdrew from the two hills.
On November 7th, the RCT was ordered to take up a defensive position on the line. The remainder of the RCT went into reserve with the 25th ID. Training was carried on, stressing offensive action and heightening the level of combat proficiency of the units. On January 24, 1952, the Team opened its "Battle School" (a training program), which continued until the latter part of February. The Regiment then moved into position on the Minnesota Line (part of the "Punch Bowl") at the beginning of March. Patrols were organized with the mission of delaying attempted enemy probes and warning to the main line of resistance. By early May, the 35th RCT was moved from the Minnesota Line back to the Kansas Line to prepare blocking and defensive positions. In addition, the unit was given the mission of preparing counterattack plans and to provide the counterattacking force. Undergoing intensive rehearsals of the counterattacking plans, the RCT remained in this position until June 1952. During the first weeks of June, the unit again took its role on the main defensive line. During the weeks that followed, the Team continued to improve its main defensive positions, conducted raids and patrols. At the end of August, the unit was again placed in reserve.
On October 25th, armistice negotiations were resumed at the new site of Panmunjom.
During November 1952, the 35th RCT received orders to Chimpo Ri and reverted to control of its parent unit, the 25th ID. In mid-December, the Team was again in contact with the enemy.
In January 1953, the Team was occupied with improving and defending positions on Line Missouri; at the end of the month, they were back in reserve.
During early May 1953, the Team assumed responsibilities in the Munsan-Ni area, overlooking the Panmunjom corridor, and immediately began aggressive patrols. These patrols continued until July 7th, when units of the Team were temporarily relieved of their combat mission, moved into reserve, and then convoyed to Camp Casey for rehabilitation and training. The armistice agreement was signed July 27th. The Team, having participated in all 10 campaigns of the Korean War, remained at Casey until September 10, 1954 when the reverted 35th Infantry Regiment began its return trip home to Schofield Barracks, Hawaii with the 25th ID.
Bibliography
Blair, Clay, The Forgotten War America in Korea 1950-53 Times Books, NY 1987
Hymel, Kevin Korean War at 50/September 1951 – September 2001, Army Magazine, Association of the U.S. Army September 2001
Miller, John, Jr., Carroll, Owen J., Major, U.S. Army, and Tackley, Margaret E., Korea 1951-1953 Center of Military History, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 1997
Toland, John, In Mortal Combat, William Morrow and Co., Inc., NY 1991 |
